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7 
Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework 
for International Taxation: April 1, 2013 
The following represents an edited transcript of a colloquium held 
at Washington University School of Law on April 1, 2013, entitled 
“Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for International 
Taxation.” The presentation was in the form of a dialogue among 
participants, but it has been edited to read as a narrative on the topic. 
The transcript will begin with an introduction from Leila Sadat, 
Henry H. Oberschelp Professor of Law and Director of the Whitney 
R. Harris World Law Institute, the sponsor of the colloquium. 
 
LEILA SADAT:  My name is Leila Sadat and I direct the Harris 
Institute. I’m here for a thirty-second infomercial to talk to you a 
little bit about the Institute, but more importantly, to thank Adam 
Rosenzweig, who’s put together this wonderful panel. The Harris 
Institute has had many international business and international trade 
lectures this spring, in an effort to branch out and look more at the 
private and public commercial law area. And a key goal of the 
Institute, of course, is to foster collaboration, dialogue, and exchange 
among scholars and practitioners. I cannot think of a better or more 
timely panel than this one in order to do that. I know almost nothing 
about this entire subject, but what I’ve learned in my very short time 
with these panelists is that this is a subject that incites a lot of 
passion, because they have managed to debate it extremely 
vigorously. I haven’t seen such vigorous debates about war crimes, 
genocide, or the other areas I work on as I have about international 
tax policy. 
I want to thank all of you, as well, who made the journey either 
from Canada or somewhere a little closer to come to St. Louis. With 
that, I am going to sit and listen and learn, and I’m going to turn the 
floor back to Adam.  
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG:  Thank you very much, Leila, for those kind 
words. And also thank you for both sponsoring this event and being 
the impetus behind it. It would not have happened if you hadn’t 
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encouraged me to pursue this, and so I really appreciate all of your 
personal support and the support of the Harris Institute.  
Before we get started on the panel, I just wanted to briefly 
introduce the panelists. The goal of this roundtable is to bring 
together a diverse and wide range of different kinds of expertise on 
this issue, especially because we seem to be at a defining moment in 
the international tax regime. And the institutions and systems that are 
in place are really starting to reach a point where most are trying to 
reconceive what the proper role of institutions should be in the world 
regime.   
Immediately to my left is Allison Christians, the H. Heward 
Stikeman Chair in the Law of Taxation at McGill University. She 
practiced law at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz in New York and 
also Debevoise & Plimpton. She taught at the law schools of the 
University of Wisconsin and Northwestern University, where we 
overlapped briefly, before she joined the faculty of law at McGill. 
She is the author of a column for Tax Notes International, as well as 
an editor for the tax section of Jotwell, an online peer-review journal, 
and is the lead blogger for an influential blog, Tax, Society and 
Culture. 
Next to Professor Christians is Itai Grinberg, Associate Professor 
of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Grinberg 
joined Georgetown from the Office of the International Tax Council 
at the Department of the Treasury, where he represented the United 
States on tax matters, both in the multilateral and bilateral tax 
settings. Prior to joining Treasury, he practiced tax law at Skadden, 
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. He focused primarily on international 
tax and planning. He also served as counsel to the President’s 
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform and is a member of the 
Council on Foreign Relations. 
Next to Professor Grinberg is Michael Lennard, the Chief of 
International Tax Cooperation and Trade at the Financing for 
Development Office of the United Nations (UN). He is pretty much 
the person in charge of the Tax Cooperation project for the UN. 
Previously, Mr. Lennard was a tax treaty advisor for the OECD Tax 
Treaty Secretariat and also worked at the Australian Tax Office. He 
has published work on treaty interpretation, and has been cited before 
World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the WTO appellate 
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body. He has degrees from the University of Tasmania, the 
Australian National University, and Cambridge. 
To his left is Diane Ring, Professor of Law at Boston College, 
where she works primarily on issues of international and corporate 
tax. Among her many other activities, she was the U.S. National 
Reporter for the 2012 IFA Conference on the Debt Equity 
Conundrum, and the U.S. National Reporter for the 2004 IFA 
Conference on Double Nontaxation. Before joining Boston College, 
she was an Associate Professor at the University of Florida and an 
Assistant Professor at Harvard Law School. Before that, she practiced 
law at Caplin & Drysdale. 
To her immediate left is Lee Sheppard, contributing editor at Tax 
Analysts’ “Tax Notes.” Ms. Sheppard is probably one of the most 
influential tax journalists in the country, and is one of the most 
influential and most knowledgeable people on international tax 
matters. Lee Sheppard has a law degree from Northwestern 
University School of Law.  
What we’re going to do first is give each of our speakers an 
opportunity to speak about their personal opinions on the state of the 
current international tax regime and where they would prefer things 
to go. Then, we will open up the floor and have a conversation 
among the panelists. So with that, I’ll hand it over to Professor 
Christians. 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS:  I think this roundtable format is really an 
interesting phenomenon. While I appreciate the audience, for me, this 
is a learning experience, because I get to sit here and debate with 
people who know much more than me about everything I talk about. 
That’s always humbling. But it can be the moment when you realize 
how to think about things in a different way. So I thought I would 
talk briefly about the fact that we are in a kind of confusing time. I 
think part of the confusion is that the media coverage of tax, and 
international tax, specifically, is actually quite muddled. They don’t 
give you a great grounding, and it takes a lot of work to interpret 
what the media is telling the public.  
I think two stories are being told right now to the American news 
consumer and they are getting conflated a lot. I think the first story is 
that we have a big problem with shirkers. That is, America has a 
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problem with the rich not wanting to pay their share, and the way 
they get out of their obligations is through tax evasion. It turns out 
there are other countries that are willing to help them, and it is 
patently obvious that this is objectionable behavior to everyone. So 
we ask the questions, why doesn’t our government stop that? Why 
don’t we stop these rich people from hiding their money in other 
countries? Can’t we stop them? Is this a capacity problem? And then 
we get stories about the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) cracking 
down on various behaviors, and it turns out we can stop them. We 
can find out about people with accounts offshore, so why is this still a 
problem? That is one thread of stories you’ll see: “Tax evasion! This 
is pervasive, it’s out of control! Has the state lost its way? Why can’t 
we stop this?”   
The other story, which is related but distinct, is that we have 
multinational companies that seem to be doing something very 
similar, but it’s not tax evasion—it’s perfectly legal.  So why are we 
allowing that? Why is my government allowing that? It seems to me 
that it’s not that the companies are doing something we didn’t know 
about that we are now finding out about and trying to figure out how 
to stop. Rather, it’s that the government is actively encouraging this. 
Congress keeps passing the same tax break—yet another way to 
make sure multinationals don’t have to pay tax anywhere. And so you 
get the story of Google paying 2.4 percent and Apple having billions 
of dollars offshore. What in the world is going on? Have we lost 
control? 
So I think those two stories are being conflated, and you’ll see a 
lot of activism conflating those two stories and saying we have a 
governance problem.  
If you put those two stories together, we do have a major 
governance problem. Our governments are failing us and so are our 
multilateral approaches, such as the multinational institutions. But 
these approaches and institutions aren’t new. We didn’t just start this 
process of coordinating taxation across borders. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been around 
for fifty years, and before then, we had the League of Nations. What 
are these organizations doing, if not working together to create some 
sort of coherent system in the world? What are we paying all of these 
experts for when it doesn’t seem to be working?  
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So let’s just throw all that out there to start this conversation. 
But let’s also observe that these seem to be two distinct 
phenomena that we conflate into a governance issue and then try to 
solve all at once. I think they are distinct and they raise distinct 
governance questions that are difficult to answer. 
 
ITAI GRINBERG:  I would start out by agreeing with the basic two-
part framework that Allison described, because I agree that is the 
right way to think about the problems. I think when you talk about 
individuals and the world of cross-border cooperation, the discussion 
is about offshore tax evasion. Offshore tax evasion is just illegal. And 
addressing offshore tax evasion is therefore a law and order question. 
It’s about how we enforce compliance with the set of rules that are 
already on the books. In the United States, we have a voluntary 
compliance system with lots of safeguards. But we don’t have all of 
the information regarding voluntary reporting or withholding or both, 
and sometimes people don’t comply. Over the last five or six years, 
we have seen a series of scandals that have drawn attention at the 
highest political levels to the fact that sometimes wealthy individuals 
choose not to comply with tax rules, and that they do this by ensuring 
both their domestic business income and their investment income are 
earned through offshore accounts, thereby avoiding either 
withholding or reporting, and enabling evasion.  
That is a really different problem from the second problem that 
Allison raised, which is the question of base erosion and profit 
shifting by multinational corporations. Multinationals are engaging in 
perfectly legal behavior. This is important to understand. They may 
take aggressive tax positions with respect to certain kinds of 
transactions or return positions that they have; but, by and large, what 
they are doing is, at a minimum, colorably legal. They have opinion 
letters and counsel that suggest the tax positions they are taking 
comply with the letter of the law. They are often right about that. 
There is just a concern in the world that maybe the regime we put in 
place has allowed multinational corporations to reduce their tax 
burden by more than the various governments intended or more than 
they thought they were agreeing to over time, in what is a very long 
process. 
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The international tax compromise dates back to the 1920s and 
teens. Back then, the appropriate way to think about cross-border 
foreign direct investment was largely bilateral. When you thought 
about a U.S.-based multinational doing business in the United 
Kingdom, you thought the U.S.-based multinational would operate 
either through a branch or a subsidiary directly owned by the U.S. 
parent. That was, in fact, how business was done. So the purely 
bilateral structure of tax treaties that came into being then made a lot 
of sense on some level. Cross-border investment was, to a very 
important degree, a bilateral question.  
With regard to the planning, the real structure, of a particular 
U.S.-based multinational whose identity is concealed: for my 
purposes here, the first point to take away from that not-atypical 
structure is that, today, investments by multinational corporations are 
not, as a general matter, directly bilateral. Instead, they are inter-
mediated through entities in third-country jurisdictions. And that 
raises a different set of problems than the problems faced by the 
creators of the first model treaties after World War I.  
What I’d like to do for a minute is to deepen our perspective on 
the offshore tax evasion side, just to give us a sense of the 
international dimension of the problem, as opposed to the domestic 
dimension of the problem. Almost eight trillion dollars, representing 
more than 6 percent of all global wealth, is managed through offshore 
accounts. Now, I’ve already told you that represents both investment 
income and business principal, but let’s just make sure we understand 
what I mean by the term “offshore account.” When I say “offshore 
account,” I mean an account in a financial institution outside your 
own country of residence, like on an island or a beautiful, 
mountainous, landlocked location, or, maybe, Miami.  And let’s be 
clear, that last point is important: for Latin Americans, it very well 
could be, and often is, Miami.  
Juxtapose the fact that investing through offshore accounts has 
gotten easier over time with two other realities. First, cross-border 
administrative operations to help governments tax income earned or 
held through foreign accounts by resident country taxpayers had, 
until a few years ago, remained largely unchanged since World War 
II and is pretty limited in its practical effect. Second, the extent to 
which assets are managed offshore is not uniformly distributed 
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around the world. In general, emerging and developing economies 
are relatively more exposed to offshore tax evasion than are the large 
developed economies. To put numbers on that, less than 2 percent of 
North American residents’ wealth is held offshore, while in contrast, 
more than 25 percent of Latin American household wealth is held in 
offshore accounts, and probably 40 percent of African household 
wealth is held offshore. Further, the OECD once suggested that 
offshore tax evasion costs emerging and developing economies 
amounts that begin to approach the amount of total official 
development assistance they receive—in other words, all foreign aid 
by all governments.  
Beginning in 2008, however, some well-publicized cross-border 
tax evasion scandals focused the highest level political attention on 
offshore tax evasion in precisely those countries least affected by the 
problem but most able to do something about it. The stories really do 
read like a thriller. Tax is boring. But these were stories about 
toothpaste tubes full of diamonds being smuggled out of the United 
States. These were stories about big governments finding disgruntled 
bankers buying lists of clients from their banks and, in return, 
providing them new identities and a whole new life on another 
continent. This starts to sound like a spy novel. But the thing was, 
these stories made offshore tax evasion a concern of the G-20 when it 
had previously been only a tax administrator’s concern. The G-20 
actually put out a document that said, “The era of banking secrecy is 
over.”   
Then there was a multilateral response, which initially involved 
threatening to force bank secrecy jurisdictions to accept very 
minimum global standards on the exchange of requested information. 
Pretty soon thereafter, major developed economies took steps that 
made it clear that they viewed those rules, which allowed for cross-
border inquiries if and only if you knew which taxpayer to ask about 
and in what bank they held their account, to be pretty darn 
inadequate. These economies wanted something more systematic. So 
eventually that shared interest in a multilateral response led to part of 
a multi-pronged U.S. strategy to address offshore tax evasion. The 
strategy took everyone’s rhetoric at its word and combined 
multilateral cooperation with a very aggressive unilateral component. 
The U.S. approach effectively required foreign financial institutions 
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to report directly to the IRS about accounts held by U.S. persons. 
And, importantly, those reporting requirements applied regardless of 
restrictions placed on financial institutions under their domestic law. 
The legislation then threatened to withhold most payments coming 
out of the United States to either those institutions or their clients if 
the institutions did not comply.  
By tax law standards, America’s far-reaching sanction on foreign 
financial institutions for doing something that violates neither 
contractual commitments nor rules on privacy nor data protection in 
their home countries is quite draconian. At the same time, it’s also an 
axiom of modern finance that, for a variety of reasons, all of the 
major players have to do business in the United States or with U.S. 
institutions. As a result, these large multinational financial 
institutions are between a rock and a hard place. Meanwhile, foreign 
sovereigns have looked at the legislation and thought, “How do we 
address this, both on our own behalf and on behalf of our financial 
institutions?” These sovereigns are keenly aware that the Foreign 
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) was unilateral: the United 
States asked for information from abroad but gave nothing back in 
return.  
But the displeasure with the unilateral nature of FATCA, 
combined with the shared desire to address offshore tax evasion, has 
produced a multilateral dialogue. The question now is how to emulate 
this legislation but make it both implementable—so that it doesn’t 
require private parties to violate local law—and more reciprocal—so 
that it addresses the offshore tax evasion concerns of cooperating 
governments other than just the United States. We now have a very 
serious dialogue going on in the world, effectively about FATCA and 
how to have an effective multilateral system based on FATCA 
principles to address offshore tax evasion generally, and not just for 
the United States. Everyone agrees the conversation is taking place, 
but not everyone agrees it will resolve the issue well. Still, everyone 
thinks it’s happening and it wasn’t happening before. So what I am 
trying to point out is that there is kind of a dialectic to some of these 
things. You may think you get from point A to point B in a straight 
line, but you don’t always get there in a straight line. Sometimes you 
have to go from thesis to antithesis to get to synthesis; from the idea 
that there is a shared interest that deserves a multilateral response to 
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aggressive unilateral action in order to get to an efficacious 
multilateral response to a global problem. I think that sort of dynamic 
is worth thinking about when you think about the international tax 
system, both with regard to offshore tax evasion and with regard to 
addressing profit shifting by multinational corporations.  
The last thing I would point out is that the solution to the offshore 
tax evasion issue largely involved the G-20 bringing the question of 
offshore tax evasion into the broader framework of international 
financial law. It involved using institutional vehicles that were 
previously familiar with areas like capital adequacy standards and 
addressing money laundering and terrorist financing. In the future, I 
think analysts should be cognizant of those precedents when they see 
the G-20 engaging in tax matters. Tax is getting pulled into a kind of 
international soft law structure that a lot of people have a lot of 
experience with. It just turns out people who have experience with it 
are mostly not tax lawyers. You can think about the G-8 and the way 
the Basel Committee [on Banking Supervision] works, or a variety of 
other institutions that are out there. That may tell you something 
about where we are headed with respect to international tax law and 
international tax cooperation, including in connection with the 
OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project. 
 
MICHAEL LENNARD: I will speak entirely in my personal capacity, 
probably because you can never achieve agreement among the 193 
members of the UN. But also because a lot of these things have not 
been fully discussed in the UN, so speaking in my personal capacity 
gives me a lot more freedom. The background that I look at is the UN 
background, and therein lies part of the problem. In our tax work, a 
lot of people initially thought we were very anti-business at the UN, 
which is not true at all. We basically have three pillars of our work 
and everything is a bit of balance between those pillars. The first 
pillar is that countries need revenue to get public goods, which leads 
to development. Our work is very much in the development context 
and also concerns allowing countries to assert their sovereignty, so 
that in the global economic crisis, they have a bit of a buffer against 
what is happening in the rest of world, which in some respects is an 
issue of sovereignty—something that is always very important in the 
UN.  
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The second pillar makes things a bit more complex. Nearly every 
country in the world sees foreign direct investment as helpful for 
development. But at the same time, it is up to each country how it 
wants to develop. This means that most countries are seeking a way 
to create sufficient public revenue for use on public goods. They 
recognize it is important to lifting people up out of poverty, affording 
them dignity, and achieving specific development goals. But they 
also want to have the right sort of investment. They don’t want to 
strangle the golden goose. They want to have a regime that actually 
encourages investment so that it will lead to long-term benefits for 
their people, including getting business expertise and so forth. 
And the third issue, which is a very interesting issue at the 
moment, is who creates the norms. Because in the UN, we believe 
there shouldn’t be “norm-makers” as distinct from “norm-takers.” 
You have heard the reference to the OECD’s work with the G-20 on 
base erosion and profit shifting, and I won’t go into detail on that, but 
there are hints that there needs to be a change in the way we look at 
taxation. Particularly in the new digital economy there have been 
battles about this within the OECD. There are different views, for 
example, about the level of economic engagement that could allow a 
source country (the country that is not the resident state of the 
investor) to tax activities in that country. This is because there’s an 
idea that you shouldn’t try to tax everything that happens in your 
country, because you want to give businesses the chance to put a toe 
in the water to see if it’s right for them to do business in your 
country. Then, at a certain point, the investor becomes so engaged 
that it becomes proper for both the investor’s country of residence 
and the country where the investment is made to tax the profits of the 
investment. And that’s a problem, because if you have double 
taxation on the same person—or even on the same profits of the 
corporate group—that cuts against the other intent I mentioned of 
trying to encourage foreign investment.  
It’s a very interesting time, partly because we are moving to a 
more multipolar world in the area of taxes and so many other areas. 
We did some work on transfer pricing, which can equate to 
international profit shifting. A “transfer price” is just the price that 
multinational corporations have to allocate to transactions within 
their corporations, to find out which areas are doing well and which 
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areas are not doing well, which are well-run and not so well-run. 
However, there can be abuses of this so-called transfer “mis-pricing,” 
where profits can be shifted into low-tax jurisdictions and out of 
other jurisdictions, like developing countries. That can seriously 
affect tax revenue for the developing countries. 
Where profits are taxed depends on where value is created, and 
there are often different views on this. One example is that in India, 
you don’t buy a Suzuki car. You buy a Maruti Suzuki car because 
when Suzuki initially went into India, no one really knew about 
Suzuki, but they knew about Maruti. There was a benefit to Suzuki in 
having “Maruti Suzuki” vehicles. There are all sorts of issues about 
where the value in the Maruti Suzuki brand originates. How much of 
it belongs to Suzuki (i.e., imported value)? How much of it belongs 
to Maruti (i.e., home-grown value), which enhanced the value of 
Suzuki? And how do changes in value occur over time?   
So there are some issues there; and I think in the OECD’s work, 
there is a tension between value being created in both these areas in 
the market, but also in the Research and Development manufacturing 
area. How do you allocate that? We see this in the work we’ve done 
on transfer pricing in India and China. We gave them some space in 
Chapter 10 of the UN Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for 
Developing Countries, and they both put a lot of emphasis on the 
advantages or special value added by their markets and how to 
attribute that value when determining profits. 
And how you attribute that value to the global group as a whole is 
quite a controversial area, but it shows a bit of a changing of the 
guard. That’s not as true in the OECD report—they still refer to the 
marketing and branding as the tail end of the value creation, which 
I’m not sure India and China would really agree with if they thought 
about the implications. We are moving towards a more multipolar 
world, and one of the interesting things, as a lawyer, is that none of 
these solutions are easy.  
Obviously, I work for the UN, so I believe in multilateral 
solutions. But I think, in the end, these areas are so complex that 
sometimes you need a smorgasbord of different approaches to deal 
with them. Sometimes unilateral actions can offer a benefit toward 
actually getting something to happen. And a lot of UN countries look 
to what’s happening in the European Commission, such as on the 
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common consolidated corporate tax base. They look at whether that 
works and whether, at the regional level, that will have a broader 
impact.  
But there are some downsides to unilaterialism. Of course, one of 
the downsides is that you’re back in the old “norm-makers” and 
“norm-takers” approach. Another downside is that a unilateral 
solution may have some real defects. If the unilateral solution comes 
from the United States, then, dare I say, there might be some 
problems with it, which, for lobbying or other reasons, are never 
addressed. Even if that unilateral solution leads to multilateral 
solutions, you may not be able to deal with some of those 
deficiencies, and you may create distortions, and so forth. There are 
some other downsides, too. One is that unilateral solutions tend to 
come from developed countries, and when that does happen, they’re 
often very complex. At the UN, we believe that sometimes, even if 
there’s a genuine problem, a really complex solution is not actually in 
the interests of developing countries. They just don’t have the 
capacity to deal with really complex solutions, and they feel, 
justifiably or not, that if a complex solution is required, or a complex 
regime is in place, then they’re going to start from a position of 
weakness when they sit down with a multinational enterprise, or with 
the United States Treasury, or with the IRS. This is a really difficult 
concern to avoid, because there are not many simple solutions in this 
area. Sometimes I think we have to have solutions that are graduated, 
so that, for example, countries that are just coming to the world of 
profit shifting may be able to have a bit more freedom with their 
rules, at least in the short term.  
But, again, there’s a strong quest for a single set of rules in this 
area, which doesn’t always work, in my experience. Everyone wants 
a single set of rules, but when you speak to someone singly, you 
realize some want to drive on the left-hand side of the road and some 
want to drive on the right-hand side. And each is convinced that 
that’s the best rule for the world. It’s just not going to happen that 
you get complete certainty. So what we try to do in the UN is 
recognize that there will be differences, try to minimize the number 
of unnecessary differences, and help countries to make informed 
decisions about which route to take. Some solutions that might work 
for China might not work for Botswana, for all sorts of reasons. 
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One set of solutions are the bilateral solutions, such as double tax 
treaties. We have our own Model Tax Treaty, and it is very much a 
model that gives options to countries. If you have strong withholding 
taxes, that can be good for a developing country, because withholding 
taxes are a pretty easy way of making sure your country can actually 
get some tax revenue from royalties or interest payments and 
dividend payments. On the other hand, you don’t want to tax, say, 
royalty payments related to intellectual property so high that no one 
will send new intellectual property into your country, and your 
country won’t develop because it won’t get the expertise which 
allows you to develop. So everything is a balancing act in this area. 
Another problem with the bilateral solution is that it can become 
horrendously out of date because you have a certain treaty network, 
and the more countries you’re dealing with, the harder it is to find 
time to go back and update, particularly to deal with new tax 
avoidance approaches.  
Multilateral treaties have a lot of potential benefits, as long as they 
have sufficient real political support and real support on the ground. 
One of the issues at the moment is this talk about reshaping the 
norms of international taxation. I think there’s a hint of seeking a 
multilateral agreement about what’s called “permanent 
establishment.” This is considered the minimum threshold level of 
economic activity of a non-resident business in a source country 
before that source country can impose income tax on that business 
under a tax treaty. 
One of the benefits of the multilateral approach is the “stickiness” 
of genuinely agreed-upon norms. But to get a really sticky norm that 
people will actually feel ownership in, and will abide with in practice, 
you need to engage them in the process of actually developing those 
norms. One of the risks I see at the moment for trying to reshape the 
norms is that there is a sense that, to keep the G-20 support, things 
have to happen quickly. Because we all know political will can 
dissipate overnight, as politicians become focused on other issues. A 
lot of international politics is very short term. And one of the 
problems is, if you try to respond by remaking the world very, very 
quickly, how are you going to make sure you have norms that 
developing countries, particularly those who are not in the G-20, 
actually feel that they have any commitment to or ownership of? In 
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the end, if you’re not careful, you might end up with a system where 
you have some headline agreement—“we’ve remade the rules for 
international taxation”—but, in practice, the rules are actually all 
interpreted in completely different ways around the world. So I think 
there are some real issues. I believe the UN is not used as much as it 
should be on these international tax issues to seek real agreement that 
will not unfold in practice.   
Another aspect of the multipolar world is the role of Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs). NGOs are driving a lot of this 
debate and they have a role that I think is legitimate. We’ve always 
recognized the importance of NGOs in this debate at the UN. We’ve 
recognized the importance of giving a voice to taxpayers who do pay 
their due taxes, expecting that others will pay their proper tax bill. 
But, then again, there’s a responsibility for NGOs not to unfairly 
target companies that might actually have been doing the right thing, 
and not to make them subject to a boycott they might not deserve.  
Often you hear a reference to a company, and then you’ll see that 
everyone accepts what they’re doing as perfectly legal. Well, even 
that debate could be opened up a bit. First of all, you often don’t 
know until you’ve done a full audit whether they have fully 
accounted the amount of that intellectual property that should relate 
to the sale in the United Kingdom, United States, Australia, or 
developing countries. You often don’t know. But even if you do, I 
can see a lot of taxpayers saying, “Well, even if it is legal, that 
doesn’t really answer my question,” because the multinationals that 
are involved are so powerful that they actually have a big role in 
shaping the law. So it is not a complete response for the companies to 
say, “We’re abiding with the law and that’s really all we need to do.” 
There are issues about whether the law is shaped too much in favor of 
multinationals, as opposed to in favor of the person who pays their 
taxes.  
And there’s another aspect, and that is the belief that strict 
compliance with the tax laws is enough. From the UN perspective, 
there are some disadvantages to strict compliance for developing 
countries, because developing countries often don’t have the robust 
legal mechanisms that developed countries do. So if we put a lot of 
emphasis on a strict compliance approach rather than a more 
purposive approach, then are we disadvantaging developing countries 
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that are not in a position to have huge teams of people dealing with 
complex transfer pricing legislation the way developed countries 
might? Sometimes you need a purposive approach that says, “Well, 
we never anticipate that a company would do this, but, in the wider 
scheme of the legislation, if a company does this, this company 
should be regarded as having taken too many risks, and having not 
acted in accordance with the intent behind the legislation.” 
 
DIANE RING: I thought at this point, first, I would disagree with 
Itai completely. International tax is the most interesting thing I could 
ever imagine doing! So part of what I want to do is just touch upon 
one issue that’s been hinted at during different parts of the 
conversation so far, because it really is exciting. As Allison outlined, 
we’ve got two major sets of problems. One is the world of “I’m not 
paying my taxes, I’m hiding my money.” That is clearly illegal. 
Then, the other is the way corporations, whether acting in a way we 
think of as strictly legal, moderately legal, or legal with a wink, have 
substantially reduced their contribution to government revenues 
across the globe.  
When Adam raised the idea of this roundtable with us, one of the 
points he focused on was the question of what kind of cooperation we 
seek, what kinds of international organization we want engaged in 
these problems, and how we should think about this process going 
forward in a global manner. So I would pick up on one thread of that. 
I think the locus for change might need to shift. There are different 
types of change when responding to non-identical problems. And the 
change itself could be procedural or administrative or substantive, 
depending on exactly what part of the problem you’re looking at. But 
before considering the contours of any solution, it may be useful to 
be explicit about why governments and policy analysts should care 
about both tax evasion and tax avoidance. The reason is the loss of 
revenue. Countries are missing actual tax revenue, and the 
combination of avoidance and evasion is changing who pays the 
revenue that is collected. 
Additionally, to the extent that taxpayers pursue tax planning 
opportunities based, for example, on transfer pricing and hybrid 
entities, not only is tax revenue lost but so is underlying business 
activity. In order to secure the significant gains of tax avoidance, 
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taxpayers may actually shift some activity—not enough to change the 
view that the transactions constitute “tax avoidance,” but enough to 
increase the likelihood that the desired tax treatment will be secured. 
So there are all kinds of impacts that come from the problems being 
described.  
That leads me to the question, who are all of the players? You 
have lots of different people who care. You have different 
governments, and we’ve heard discussion about developing 
countries, particularly the UN perspective. We know the 
multinationals and their advisers are also engaged and powerful 
forces in the tax picture. Thus, we need to think somewhat 
multilaterally to address some of these questions, such as whether 
organizations currently playing a key role remain the best locus for 
discussion, cooperation, and/or change going forward, or whether a 
different organization might have advantages. It is not hard to 
imagine that many of the problems of evasion and avoidance cannot 
be resolved unilaterally. States need information and control over 
taxpayers. They may need various forms of administrative assistance. 
Thus, there has to be some kind of coordination. When you envision 
that kind of coordination, you imagine countries and their 
representatives coming together in some way. 
Let’s imagine we have that. So we’ve identified settings in which 
these conversations are going to take place. Whether these are 
existing settings or new settings, countries are sending their 
representatives. Let’s even imagine those representatives are thrilled. 
And they’re thrilled not just to be in Paris—that’s probably where we 
want to hold it, someplace lovely—but they are thrilled because they 
are really excited to converse. They actually care about which 
taxpayers bear the tax burden, whether countries are collecting 
enough revenue, and whether developing countries collect any 
revenue. Even if we have all of that, can we deliver good results? If 
I’m the United States, and I send a representative from the IRS or 
Treasury to this meeting, what can that representative promise to 
other countries? What can they deliver? You can’t control a 
democracy. There are limits on what this U.S. representative could 
guarantee.  
Recognition of this constraint on the ease of establishing 
successful cooperation leads to a related observation. Many of the 
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problems underlying the picture of evasion and avoidance today, we, 
the United States, have created. Just to give an example, recall the 
check-the-box rules as applied in the cross-border context. The 
United States said, “Taxpayers, given that sometimes you have been 
able to achieve the entity classification that you want, perhaps we 
should just let you directly choose from the outset. Check a box and 
tell us whether you want to be a corporation, partnership, or a 
disregarded entity. You decide. It’s up to you.” And the planning 
potential for that, internationally, has just been, well, glorious. At 
least if you are among the entities relying substantially on check-the-
box and hybrid entities for tax planning. But check-the-box is 
disastrous if you’re trying to collect revenue. We, the United States, 
control that entirely; we could change it if we wanted. But in the 
context of a global discussion of cooperation, could our hypothetical 
representative to the international conversation make that kind of 
promise or commitment? No. Congress would need to be on board, 
and the IRS and Treasury cannot guarantee that result. 
There are other examples of the constraints that the democratic 
process places on the ability of countries, including the United States, 
to commit internationally to key tax changes. Itai already talked 
about information exchange. If you are trying to find out who is 
hiding money in international banks, you can start to exchange 
information. We want all these other countries to give us information, 
right? Great, well, what do you think they want? Maybe information 
on their own citizens who are hiding money here? We have problems 
doing that. We’re not currently set up to be able to make our banks 
collect all of that information. We can’t turn it over, or we’re not 
doing it. Our representative to this willing, international organization, 
if that’s the format we envisioned, couldn’t promise that our 
legislature is going to make that complete exchange of information 
work.  
Think about the Swiss banking scandals, with which we’re very 
familiar. I think these scandals really did give international tax the 
global excitement it now has. The Swiss are famous for bank secrecy. 
One of the things I gradually came to understand over time, 
particularly with my Swiss tax colleague, is the degree to which 
Swiss banking secrecy had a powerful domestic constituency not 
directly connected to the banking sector. That is, we in the United 
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States (and globally) think of Swiss banking secrecy as a tool of the 
Swiss banks to collect clients around the world. And that’s certainly 
true—bank secrecy provides great value added to the client. But what 
I didn’t understand or appreciate was the separate role bank secrecy 
played domestically in Swiss political and social culture. During the 
late 2000s, as the Swiss government was trying to work through a 
solution with the United States to address U.S. tax evasion facilitated 
by or through Switzerland, the Swiss had to deal with their own 
democracy. They had to deal with their own legislative structure and 
their judicial system’s response to the deal put in place by the Swiss 
government.  
And so even if you get some countries to the table and they send a 
representative, what can those representatives actually deliver? I 
think the ability to meaningfully commit to steps requiring notable 
domestic legislative change is a continuing problem as we 
contemplate any international action, but certainly international tax 
agreements. As a representative, asserting that you want a multilateral 
solution gives the impression your country will be acting as a 
monolith. But really, that is ignoring the fact that, underneath, you 
are a democracy with a huge, messy, and very interest group-driven 
legislative process you must confront. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD:  I want to go back to what Allison said about two 
different problems. As Americans, we can only talk for the United 
States, although I think there are problems elsewhere in the world, 
too. In the United States, we have huge governance problems. I don’t 
look at everything through the lens of just taxation, either. I write 
about banking and securities issues, as well, and I just see enormous, 
enormous governance problems. And when I look at the individual 
side, which is the tax evasion side, I basically see that as a banking 
problem and a tax administration problem. Think about the UBS 
scandal, which was the first bank we caught for tax evasion. The 
Americans caught them because this guy showed up. If he hadn’t 
shown up, this would all just be a huge lump underneath the rug at 
the edge of the room. It was embarrassing that he showed up because 
the IRS was looking the other way. We were not auditing rich 
people’s returns. Rich folks were not reporting their bank accounts. 
And the only reason we ended up taking extreme measures to combat 
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this, like you see with FATCA, is because Congress was truly 
shocked by the extent of the problem.  
What’s funny—and our other speakers pointed this out—is that 
our rich people are pretty darn patriotic compared to other countries’ 
rich people, as Itai was alluding. I mean, in other countries, pretty 
much everyone with two nickels to rub together, or whatever the 
currency is, has a bank account someplace else and is not fully 
reporting their taxes. Our rich people are pretty honest. But you’re 
dealing with a Congress where the percentage of senators who do not 
have passports is pretty high. You’re dealing with a Congress that 
just does not understand that some people, given the opportunity to 
cheat their taxes, will do it.  
My answer is: withhold first, and ask questions later. I think that’s 
where we’re going to go with FATCA. If you look at FATCA from 
the perspective of a banker, who has to—and wants to—comply with 
it, you realize he’ll ask himself, “How am I going to get my rich 
people’s attention? Am I going to call them in and say ‘dump that 
purse on the table, show me if there’s any blue passports in there?’ 
No, I’m going to write them a little letter saying, ‘Commencing on X 
date, we will be withholding 30 percent on the payments out of your 
account, unless you fill out this form.’” That’s the way it ought to 
work, that’s the way it’s going to have to work. It’s not going there 
yet because what we put in place in 2010 has to be given the 
opportunity to fail. It has to have the opportunity to sort of shuffle 
along until we find something easier to administer. But eventually, 
we’ll get to automatic information sharing and basically threats to 
withhold. That’s the end game, but for now we’re going to say, “You 
must give us this information.”  
But I also look at this as a banking problem, because Switzerland 
is a haven for individuals, and it’s an enabler for corporations. 
Countries that are havens and enablers have to be in the banking 
system and have their payments cleared. To be an enabler, you have 
to be in the treaty system and you have to have treaties with countries 
like the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. Basically, if 
you are a haven or an enabler, you are acting at the pleasure of these 
other countries, and once they decide to pull the plug on you, they 
can. So you see, if we really didn’t want bank secrecy, we would 
have pulled the plug on these countries. We have kicked countries out 
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of the banking system before. We have not kicked countries out of 
the banking system because of tax evasion yet, but if we wanted to 
kick somebody out of the clearing system, it could be done. And, you 
know, we wouldn’t need to kick thirty tax havens out of the clearing 
system. We could just find a little one and kick it out of the clearing 
system, and then the other ones would straighten up.  
I was on television once, and the host asked, “What’s the 
legitimate use of a tax haven bank account?” I said, “To hide money 
from your ex-wife.” And I still believe that. The reason we tolerate 
this is so people can do things like hide money from their ex-wives 
and their business partners and whomever else they’re hiding money 
from. That shouldn’t be legal either—and it isn’t—but, you know, 
these havens only exist because we’ve allowed them to be in the 
system.  
When Allison and I were in Scandinavia, we looked at an article 
about a real company and what their set up was, and we just sat there 
with our mouths open. We were going, “Wait a minute, this is 
completely kosher under U.S. law! There’s nothing wrong with this 
under U.S. law. As a matter of fact, it’s pretty clean, compared to 
what some people do!” I think the reason is that, as an internal 
morality or policy matter, the United States doesn’t really have a 
problem with it. It’s just that the United States has a world 
reputational and political problem with it. But does the United States 
itself care whether some multinationals pay tax to other countries—or 
even, when you get down to it, whether they pay taxes to the United 
States? No, I don’t think so.  
But other countries, such as China and India (which is in the same 
posture as China) and Western Europe, are angry about this. Even 
though a lot of the tax evasion structuring is pretty legal under the 
systems in Western Europe, those countries will come and challenge 
you on a particular commission agent or limited risk distributor. 
They’re not happy at all about the structuring. And India and China 
are not happy about this either. What that basically means is that 
when Allison says we’re currently in a confusing time, I’m looking at 
the breakdown of the system that permitted this.  
We don’t know what’s going to replace the structures we have 
now, but we know the end game is going to be about the market 
countries and supplier countries here not respecting what the enablers 
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are doing over there. And we know, really, what the end game is 
going to look like. We have three choices for where that taxable 
income belongs. Does it belong to the parent? That is, does the 
United States, as residence country, get to claw it all back to the 
parent? That was what the old international consensus held: give 
superior taxing rights to the residence country. But the source country 
has the first claim on the money, full stop. The original consensus 
was based on the fact that the United States and Britain were calling 
the shots.  
So that’s one choice—but that choice is foreclosed. That is not 
going to happen anymore. So the only other choices are suppliers 
versus markets. This is your end game. My bet is that the taxable 
income is going to the sales markets, through some kind of 
apportionment to the sales markets. We are about five or ten years 
before that argument is fully engaged, but we’re beginning that 
argument now. And that’s going to be our really “confusing time,” 
because we’re looking at the breakdown of an old order and the 
reentry of a new order. 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: Thank you all very much. It’s been a very 
interesting conversation. The takeaway I keep coming back to is that, 
if I accept this sort of dichotomy, this taxonomy between evasion on 
the one hand and base erosion on the other, why wouldn’t it be 
correct to state that unilateral action works for combating evasion and 
can even lead to multilateral solutions, while base erosion is more 
complicated? 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: That’s kind of what’s happening. The surprising 
thing with FATCA is that it was a drone, which I said in a speech one 
time, too. FATCA was just a really ugly, unilateral U.S. thing to put 
out there. But then other countries with proportionally bigger 
problems said, “All right, we need information, too, so we’re just 
going to get on this bandwagon.” 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: So unilateral action, such as FATCA, is just 
a hammer? 
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ALLISON CHRISTIANS: I think she called it a doomsday machine. 
A doomsday machine, where, once it’s set in motion, there’s no good 
resolution. 
 
ITAI GRINBERG: My own view is that the inevitable result of 
FATCA is a multilateral system. Because I think even a set of 
bilateral intergovernmental agreements will produce disparate 
compliance regimes, which will then lead a few important groups—
all multinational financial institutions, most emerging and developing 
economies, and a fair number of developed economies—to be 
unhappy with the nature of a fragmented bilateral compliance regime. 
That would then push the world to a multilateral system. And then, if 
it’s a doomsday machine, it’s the best doomsday machine ever seen. 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS: I don’t think so. Because the other, much 
more likely result is that the United States wins the tax haven war, 
and the United States becomes the last tax haven standing. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: Well, we are a tax haven for a certain group of 
people. But it’s also true that tax havens have certain constituents. A 
good tax haven not only has to be small, but it has to be close to the 
customers, because you have to be able to go visit your money. 
That’s why the Europeans bank in Switzerland and Liechtenstein, the 
Chinese bank in Singapore, the Americans bank in the Caymans, and 
the Latin Americans bank in Miami and Texas. But can the United 
States comply with its own FATCA?  Is the United States going to 
give up information on bank accounts in Texas and Miami to South 
American governments? 
 
ITAI GRINBERG: The United States got pushed really hard on this 
question, and it’s an obvious question for foreign sovereigns to push 
on in the context of intergovernmental agreements. It produced a 
couple responses. First, the United States previously only provided 
what’s called “bank deposit interest information” to Canada, and 
we’ve now changed our regulations to let us provide that information 
to everybody. Second, the first five countries the United States talked 
to were Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy, as a 
group. These countries aren’t pushovers, and this resulted in a 
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political commitment in the documents to get to fully reciprocal 
exchange. This led to the unusual phenomenon of the Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs getting up on panels, 
with her European colleagues sitting next to her, and saying there was 
a political commitment by the administration to get into full 
reciprocity. So I wouldn’t be so confident that there isn’t a limit to 
the hypocrisy sovereigns can engage in, even a really strong 
sovereign. And I think you’ll see that play out. 
 
DIANE RING: But how much can the IRS or Treasury really 
deliver? To the extent we are talking about changing regulations, that 
would be within their purview. But they cannot change anything at 
the Congressional level. The most they can do is try to put pressure 
on Congress. But what has changed regarding these issues of evasion 
and avoidance that makes the likelihood of change at the 
Congressional level now more plausible? 
 
ITAI GRINBERG: This is a great point. We don’t have a 
parliamentary system, which makes a big difference. But you 
shouldn’t think that no country has a parliamentary system. In fact, 
we’re the outlier. In most countries, when the representative shows 
up at the OECD and says, “We will do something,” they mean, “We 
will put it in the budget and it will pass our parliament.” Obviously, 
the United States cannot do that, and that creates some complexity. 
But I can see a variety of paths to mounting the sort of political 
pressure in the United States necessary to overcome this issue. 
 
MICHAEL LENNARD: Sometimes getting the other countries on 
board will actually help. I’m not sure that will work in the United 
States, but sometimes by promising something, we can create 
expectations, which can actually make the thing that we want happen. 
The problem is, it’s a high-stakes game here. 
 
ITAI GRINBERG: Look at the United States’ actions on the question 
of beneficial ownership in the context of the International Financial 
Action Task Force. You might suggest that a lot of people in the 
United States were concerned about the beneficial ownership 
problem in state law, and have been happy to see the United States 
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take criticism in that regard. Part of the reason is that these are fair 
criticisms, but it also seems there is utility, in terms of domestic 
political dynamics, in having international norms with respect to 
which the country is not fully compliant. 
 
MICHAEL LENNARD: There is, but there’s also utility in having a 
forum where you can be criticized. Often, individual delegates say, 
“Actually, I agree with them, but I can’t officially say that.” So it’s 
sometimes quite useful to come back home bringing criticisms you 
can pass on. 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS: I’m actually very encouraged. The more 
the United States commits itself publicly, the more it creates those 
expectations, and you think there’s got to be a deliverable. What 
really has happened so far is that you have an intergovernmental 
agreement (IGA) that is currently in force with Mexico. This IGA is, 
in name, a reciprocal information exchange agreement under which 
Mexico agrees to implement FATCA with respect to Mexican 
institutions, and the United States agrees to gather some tax 
information relevant to Mexico from U.S. institutions, and that it is 
“committed” to exchanging information with Mexico. But the 
domestic regulations that would enable the United States to meet this 
commitment clearly state that the IRS is not compelled to exchange 
information—that the United States unilaterally reserves the right to 
not share if it decides there are concerns regarding the use of the 
information or if other factors exist that would make exchange 
inappropriate.
1
 So this is an agreement in force whereby the United 
States is going to be collecting information on Mexican account 
holders and might, if it decides—in its sole discretion and without 
review or input of the other country—that the conditions are 
appropriate, hand that information over to Mexico. Is that happening? 
It’s absolutely not happening yet, but is it likely to happen? There is a 
lot of resistance to gathering and sharing information on foreign 
account holders on the part of U.S. banks. In fact, there is a lawsuit 
occurring right now to prevent this, brought by the Texas and Florida 
 
 1. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5), 1.6049-8 (2014). 
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Bankers Associations. Treasury’s response in a motion for summary 
judgment reiterates that the regulations do not require the Service to 
exchange information, automatically or otherwise, with any or every 
foreign country.
2
 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: There’s a discretionary clause in our agreements 
that says if we think the account holders will be endangered in their 
own country, we won’t hand over the information. So what’s really 
going to happen—and Mexico is a test case—is we are sometimes 
going to fold our arms and refuse to give bank account information to 
Central and South American governments on the ground that all their 
rich people will be endangered in their own countries. If we do that, 
we are basically saying, “We don’t trust your government to behave 
properly and responsibly with this information.” 
 
ITAI GRINBERG: I think we’ll exchange with Mexico. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: Yes, and we do exchange some information with 
Mexico. But it’s kind of in batches, and it’s only corporate 
transactions. But the other thing about bank deposit interest is that it 
is about an individual who directly holds an ordinary bank account. 
That is not the way sophisticated rich people hold their money. That’s 
really the dumb money, so why are we talking about only that? We 
have the precedent with Canada, for one thing. But for another, we 
are also only talking about that because we are only going to give up 
as much information as the Europeans give up among themselves. 
The Europeans have a savings directive where they sometimes just 
collect money from Switzerland without getting any information, and 
sometimes they get information. But they’re only doing it for the 
dumb money. They’re only doing it for directly held bank accounts. 
They’re going to rewrite their savings directive to get on all these 
vehicles that rich people hold their money through, but they haven’t 
finished doing that yet. They started doing that five years ago, and 
they’re still working through it. When they finish doing that, there 
 
 2. See generally Florida Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, No. 13-529, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3521 (D.C. Jan. 13, 2014). 
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will be pressure on us to start looking through Delaware trusts and 
Nevada corporations and all these naughty little nameless things we 
have available to foreigners and to our own people in the United 
States. It’s this kind of funny little game between the United States 
and Europe that’s like, “We can’t be giving up any more information 
than they’re giving up.” 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS: The mantra is that “we can’t act alone. We 
have to only work in concert.”  
 
LEE SHEPPARD: If you went to Congress and said, “We have to 
give up Delaware trust information,” Congress would say, “Well, 
what are we getting from them?” The weird irony from that whole 
competition is that it’s not like French people are hiding a whole lot 
of money in the United States. They could. They could go in through 
the Cayman Islands and they could hide money in the United States if 
they wanted. But that’s not their big hiding place. So we’re dealing 
with the Western Europeans. We both have problems, but we don’t 
really have those problems with each other. That’s the goofiness with 
bilateral solutions! Bilateral is kind of dumb in that it is premised on 
equal bargaining power; but you don’t have a meeting of the minds 
when the United States signs a tax information-sharing agreement 
with the haven because the haven doesn’t need any information from 
the United States. So you really have got to go to multilateral options 
and withholding mechanisms. We have to learn to stop clinging to the 
bilateral approach, which is the way we’ve always done things. We 
need to move on.  
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: That leads me to the next question. Thinking 
about it just in a very simple bilateral circumstance, why aren’t the 
incentives to cooperate the same when there are five countries instead 
of two? Why don’t all five say, “None of us like this because there’s 
free money on the table. Let’s all sit together and divvy it up?” One 
would think the bilateral model easily extrapolates to a multilateral 
one. So why has that not been the case?  
 
ITAI GRINBERG: First of all, you have the residence-source 
conflict. That’s the traditional explanation. Second, you have the 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  A New Framework for International Taxation 33 
 
 
intermediary jurisdictions that are not incentivized to see this change. 
So you have to figure out a number of things: whether you’re 
allocating the revenue to a source country or residence country, and 
based on what rubric, and you have to take account of the fact that for 
some jurisdictions, the status quo is just fine. These are not just 
traditional tax havens, thought of as islands in the Caribbean; they’re 
mostly jurisdictions with a pretty broad sense of tax-free 
relationships.   
There is a more complicated dynamic in terms of reaching a 
resolution, because you have to agree on what the problem is, and 
then once you agree on the problem, which I think to some degree we 
have done, at least at the G-20 level, you then have to decide how to 
solve it. One of the few things that both the Administration and the 
House Ways and Means Committee appear to agree on is that you 
need measures to address base erosion. So you see that in 
[Representative Dave Camp’s] draft proposal,3 and you also see that 
in the Administration’s minimum tax, and in some sense, they’re not 
all that different. But both of them are residence-country solutions, 
whereas the rest of the world describes base erosion and profit 
shifting as a source-country base-stripping problem. And so you 
immediately see some of the tension arising there. 
And among the countries that describe it as a source-country 
problem, there are a lot of source countries with different opinions, 
especially those with big, developed economies, who think of 
themselves as source jurisdictions. Some people have some very 
different ideas about what the new pragmatic compromise should be, 
and it’s hard to resolve that because it’s going to be just another 
pragmatic compromise.   
 
DIANE RING: To me, it was really striking. I think actually solving 
the problem of hidden bank accounts seems so much easier. After the 
past day and a half, I feel very comfortable. I see that this will 
actually work itself out within my lifetime. But regarding the 
differences between source and residence, I am not sure that we are 
 
 3. See Press Release, Committee on Ways and Means, Camp Releases International Tax 
Reform Discussion Draft (Oct. 26, 2011), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/news/ 
documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=266168. 
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going to have any solution. Just to give an example, what is it that a 
country actually thinks? What clear vision does it seek to pursue? 
Consider the United Kingdom. Over the summer and fall, the public 
press was reporting British outrage over multinationals avoiding 
United Kingdom tax laws—these were mostly U.S. corporations, but 
some were from the United Kingdom itself. And then there was a 
potential boycott of Starbucks. Virtually overnight, Starbucks, in 
response to customer pressure, decided to voluntarily pay more taxes. 
Very interesting. Based on a roundtable I went to the next day, we 
concluded it was unlikely to be creditable because it was a voluntary 
payment. 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS: But it could be deductible if it was a 
charitable donation. 
 
DIANE RING: I’m not even going there.  
 
LEE SHEPPARD: It would be a business expense. 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: It would be deductible, not creditable. 
 
DIANE RING: But why is this point about the United Kingdom and 
Starbucks relevant? At the same time, the United Kingdom was 
experiencing the culmination of its transformation into a wonderful 
place to be a multinational: “You want your patent box? We have got 
a great patent box! You want controlled foreign corporation rules that 
are even better than the last time you looked? They are revised and 
taxpayer friendly! You want a tax rate that is really attractive? We’ve 
got it!” I went down the line with each of these changes to the United 
Kingdom’s tax rules governing cross-border transactions, and I was 
floored. I would not have believed it if I had not sat through a 
presentation from a U.K. tax person outlining the changes and been 
able to question him on it. I asked, “You don’t actually think you’re 
collecting any revenue?” And he said, “We know we’re not.” What 
the United Kingdom did at the same time as it implemented these 
international tax changes was raise the individual rate. I walked away 
with so many problems in my head, one of which was, “Who is the 
United Kingdom?” Not only do I not know who we (the United 
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States) are (because I already knew I didn’t know that), but now I 
have no idea who the United Kingdom is, much less any of those 
other countries! So I don’t know what this cooperation conversation 
is going to look like. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: I think the problem is those countries I’ve called 
the “enablers.” One of the interesting things about the enablers, 
especially when they go into treaty negotiations with the United 
States, is that they have a very clear idea of who they are. The Dutch 
have a very clear idea that they are an enabler. They’re intent on 
preserving enabler status, and when they go into a treaty negotiation, 
they’ve got a shopping list of stuff they want. Then, the United States 
says, “We can’t have companies inverting—changing the residence 
of their parent company—into your country!” And in 2002, the Dutch 
sort of folded their arms and said, “What’s it worth to you?”  What I 
love about the OECD is that it has a project about this, which makes 
the Dutch very nervous, although it’s not clear that it’s going 
anywhere. The British are best understood as a gigantic banking and 
hedge fund haven and a haven for rich people who get their 
investment income from outside of Britain.  
They are kind of schizophrenic, but on the tax issue, they’ve 
basically decided that we can’t have our companies converting into 
Ireland, so we’re going to turn ourselves into a giant haven, and 
we’re going to try to get the rest of the revenue we need out of what’s 
left of our own people. But what that also points to is the question of, 
as Adam says, why don’t these other countries have an interest in 
having a little sit-down with the enablers and increasing the efforts to 
get some of them to raise their tax rates? So far, things like that have 
not worked.  
 
ITAI GRINBERG: Lee makes some profound points that I think are 
interesting to reflect on. First of all, there is this question about 
whether the United Kingdom wants to be like a regional principal 
company headquarters jurisdiction, and I think there are lots of 
reasons to think that they do. But the United Kingdom has sixty 
million people. Earlier, people talked about how you have to be kind 
of small to be a regional principal country center. I don’t think that’s 
true; you can be relatively large. There are a fairly small number of 
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countries—the United States and just a few others—that are regions 
rather than potential headquarter jurisdictions, and that’s a big deal 
when you think about the global dynamics.  
The second thing is that we have a multilateral project that helped 
get us to the race to the bottom, and it’s called the European Court of 
Justice. When you think that multilateralism is the solution, you 
should recognize there are unintended consequences to structures that 
you build, and you should ask yourself, “Where would we be today if 
the European Court of Justice hadn’t decided that the imputation 
regimes that Europe was moving towards weren’t compliant with EU 
law?” We might have had a very different debate about what a 
competitive business tax looked like. It might have been a tax that 
taxes business income once but only once, has an imputation regime, 
and, maybe, doesn’t treat foreign shareholders the same way as 
domestic shareholders. That would be a very different conversation, 
and there would be pros and cons to it, but it might not be as 
troublesome as the one we have today. 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: I think what’s coming out of this discussion 
is that there are no neutral choices. Every choice has both efficiency 
and distributive consequences. The question is: Is this a system that 
benefits, say, Luxembourg and the Netherlands over Botswana and 
Nigeria? Is that what we want from the international tax system? Or 
is the goal to actually affirmatively take distribution into account as a 
built-in cost?  
 
ITAI GRINBERG: “Should” from whose perspective, right? If I’m 
the United Kingdom, the goal that I have, and the best project, 
perhaps, is to make sure any principal country that is more attractive 
than the United Kingdom is violating the new international norms in 
one way or another. That’s a reasonable goal to have. It’s not 
necessarily their goal, but it would be a reasonable goal to negotiate 
for. So on whose behalf do I speak when I say “should”?  
 
MICHAEL LENNARD: It’s very complex, because there’s no pure 
source country or pure residence country; most countries tax to some 
degree both on a residence or source basis. And I think in the current 
climate, with everyone desperate for money, they don’t actually want 
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to give anything up either. I think that’s part of the problem. But then, 
in the United Kingdom case, for example, it’s also complicated 
because you’ve got the digital economy and you’ve got High Street 
stores that are failing—I think there were three closures in the first 
month of this year. And there’s a lot of pressure on them that goes, 
“We’ve got the bricks and mortar, we’ve invested in this country, we 
cannot compete with digital providers.” There are so many pressures 
from these entities, and the government will need to create a result 
that looks good to that constituency and to the public, which is 
suffering after budget cuts. So it’s going to be very difficult for them 
to come out with a result that is satisfactory for all three, let alone 
something that will satisfy all countries. Unless you end up with what 
I sometimes call the “Mission Accomplished” flag—that is to say, 
unless you end up with something that everyone can accept as 
satisfying the need for a “success,” so they can just go away and 
implement the minimal agreement in their own way. That would be a 
sad result, but it is possible. “Success” can simply be redefined. 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: So then the question is: Who is “us”? Who 
are “we”? And then that’s really pushing on why the OECD seems to 
be struggling, because the “we” is the relatively rich countries, so it’s 
not surprising that whoever is not an OECD member is not going to 
like whatever the OECD proposes. So what’s the path to a 
multilateral solution if the so-called enablers don’t want to join? 
Wherever you close the membership ranks, the next person’s going to 
be unhappy, right? So what’s the way out? Or maybe, like Diane 
said, we can’t envision a way out of this mess. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: A lot of us who like the idea of formulary 
apportionment as the ultimate solution look at the breakdown of this 
system, which was predicted in 1986, when the U.S. Congress tried 
to strengthen the transfer pricing rules. We started with the states that 
had formula apportionment among themselves. The world is going to 
go the way of the states in adopting formulary apportionment, plus 
economic nexus. If you are selling over the computer lines into our 
country, selling digital books or something, you’re paying a sales tax. 
The world is going there eventually. But I am not depressed, because 
I am seeing the breakdown of a silly system—because this structure 
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here, this is a twenty-year-old structure. This system has been flawed 
for years. It’s just only recently that countries are waking up and 
getting really annoyed by it. 
 
ALLISON CHRISTIANS: And it’s not just countries. NGOs are 
waking up, too. 
 
LEE SHEPPARD: There’s nothing like a couple of bricks through a 
shop window to get people’s attention. And there’s nothing like being 
in a consumer products business, where you don’t want bricks 
through your shop window, to get people’s attention. So we’ll see the 
breakdown of this system eventually. We can’t identify a source for 
intangibles or financial services income like we used to be able to do 
fifty years ago for metal mashing income. And that means you have 
to apportion it, ultimately. Right now, we apportion trading book 
income of big investment houses that pass their trading books around 
between Hong Kong, London, and New York, overnight. We 
apportion that income. We are eventually going to have to apportion 
the intangible income. We are eventually, on the individuals’ side, 
going to share information—or withhold, or something like that—and 
what we’re looking at now is the beginning of a really painful, ugly 
process of getting there. 
 
ADAM ROSENZWEIG: I think what we’ve seen here is that there 
are no simple solutions, yet, at the same time, there’s no clear way 
out, in terms of directions and institutions. Rather, this is going to 
have to be hammered out issue by issue, case by case, as we start 
building a new worldwide consensus. In some ways, that’s very 
exciting. It’s the first time in over ninety years that we’re actually 
seriously thinking about a new worldwide international consensus. 
Still, there’s no clean, pretty way out of our current debacle.  
I would like to thank our panelists very much. It’s been a very 
interesting and engaging conversation, and we’ll have to wrap it up 
there. Thank you very much. 
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